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This study analyzes how three groups of market participants—insiders, analysts, and all other
investors—revised their expectations on New York Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in response to the
catastrophic events of September 11, 2001. Our analysis reveals that, on the day when markets reopened,
REITs with significant exposure to the New York area outperformed a broad REIT office index by 4:1%.
However, we find that, according to several metrics of real market behavior, this anticipated superior
performance of New York office properties did not materialize. Further analysis of market participants’
activity in office REIT stocks indicates that insiders were the first to lower their expectations (e.g., 99:9% of
their trades in REITs with New York exposure were sales in the month following 9/11), followed by analysts
(the vast majority of them revised downward their expectations of NY REIT performance in the first weeks of
November 2001, albeit heterogeneously so), and finally market prices adjusted to reflect the underlying real
market behavior; indeed, abnormal REIT returns had disappeared by mid-November 2001. These dynamics
are consistent with theories arguing that the cross-sectional correlation of insiders and analysts’ information is
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Updating Expectations: An Analysis of Post-9/11 Returns 
Jarl Kallberg, Thunderbird School of International Management 
Crocker H. Liu, Arizona State University 
 Paolo Pasquariello, University of Michigan 
This study analyzes how three groups of market participants—insiders, analysts, and 
all other investors—revised their expectations on New York Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) in response to the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001. Our analysis reveals that, 
on the day when markets reopened, REITs with signiﬁcant exposure to the New York area 
outperformed a broad REIT ofﬁce index by 4:1%. However, we ﬁnd that, according to several 
metrics of real market behavior, this anticipated superior performance of New York ofﬁce 
properties did not materialize. Further analysis of market participants’ activity in ofﬁce REIT 
stocks indicates that insiders were the ﬁrst to lower their expectations (e.g., 99:9% of their 
trades in REITs with New York exposure were sales in the month following 9/11), followed by 
analysts (the vast majority of them revised downward their expectations of NY REIT 
performance in the ﬁrst weeks of November 2001, albeit heterogeneously so), and ﬁnally 
market prices adjusted to reﬂect the underlying real market behavior; indeed, abnormal REIT 
returns had disappeared by mid-November 2001. These dynamics are consistent with theories 
arguing that the cross-sectional correlation of insiders and analysts’ information is an 
important determinant of trading and pricing patterns in semi-strong efﬁcient market settings. 
Introduction 
A critical aspect of asset pricing is the degree to which current prices accurately reﬂect informed 
investors’ expectations of future cash ﬂows. This topic has been the subject of a voluminous and diverse 
literature. Cowles (1933) began this debate by raising the issue of how well market participants react to 
information, initiating the vast literature addressing market efﬁciency.1 Another important starting point 
in the analysis of stock market reactions to news is in the early behavioral economics research. An 
example is Kahneman and Tversky (1973), who suggested that individuals have a tendency to overweigh 
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See also Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), Jegadeesh (1990), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), as well as 
Fama (1991, 1998) and Schwert (2003) for relatively recent surveys of market efﬁciency. 
recent news.2 Numerous studies have documented market over-reaction.3 Other studies ﬁnd under-
reaction.4 In addition, researchers have documented that markets appear to be ‘‘too volatile,’’ in the 
sense that prices move much more than the levels justiﬁed by changes in ‘‘fundamentals.’’5 
Our study builds on this research by empirically examining how three separate classes of market 
participants—insiders, analysts, and all other investors—revised their expectations of returns on New 
York Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in response to the catastrophic events of September 11, 
2001. To allow our empirical analysis to be focused and tractable, we study the market presumably most 
affected: The metropolitan New York ofﬁce real estate market. The attacks of 9/11 were 
unprecedented. Besides the horriﬁc loss of human life, the devastation was immense. As of December 
21, 2001, it was estimated that 13:4 million square feet of ofﬁce space was destroyed, 12:1 million was 
damaged and remained closed, and only 5:6 million was damaged but could be re-opened 6 
This event provides a unique setting to evaluate the speed and accuracy of belief revisions of 
insiders, analysts, and all other investors following external shocks. First, this tragedy was likely 
unanticipated by market participants and thus could not have been built into pre-existing market 
expectations and prices. Second, the period of market closure that followed the attack (from Tuesday, 
September 11 to the following Monday, September 17), the longest since the Great Depression (from 
March 4 to March 14, 1933 for President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Bank Holiday), gave investors ample 
time to digest the relevant information and to incorporate it into the prices that emerged when markets 
re-opened.7 Hence, our experiment is free from short-term ‘‘behavioral’’ effects. Third, the short- and 
long-term impact of 9/11 on the New York ofﬁce market was ambiguous. From the supply side, one 
could reasonably have assumed that the destruction of a vast amount of prime ofﬁce space would drive 
                                                          
2 In particular, a number of studies have examined how bad news concerning a bank’s clients can affect the price 
of bank stocks; see, for example, Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) or Sinkey and Carter (1999). 
3 DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) address the link between mean reversion and investor over-reaction, showing 
that portfolios formed from poor performers had signiﬁcantly higher abnormal returns than portfolios formed 
from good performers. The latter paper focuses on the impact of time varying risk premia. DeBondt and Thaler 
(1990) provide evidence of over-reaction in analysts’ forecasts. Their paper builds on the earlier analysis of Elton, 
Gruber, and Gultekin (1984), who show that analysts over- (under-) estimate the growth in earnings of ﬁrms they 
believe would be good (bad) performers. More recently, Chan (2003) shows that bad news leads to signiﬁcantly 
longer drift in prices than good news. See also Barrett, Heuson, Kolb, and Schropp (1987), Lamb (1995), Veronesi 
(1999), and Carter and Simkins (2002). 
4 Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) is a recent example. Daniel, Hirschleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) 
propose a theory of market under- and over-reactions based on investors’ psychological biases. 
5 See Shiller (1981, 1989) for an introduction to this topic. 
6See Grubb and Ellis (2001). 
7French and Roll (1986) provide an analysis of volatility during periods of market closure. 
up the value of the remaining New York ofﬁce properties.8 We call this argument the supply reduction 
effect. Conversely, one could have presumed that the resulting shocks to an already teetering economy 
would have plunged the city of New York and the nation into a deep recession, negatively affecting the 
price of real estate (and other) assets. We call this argument the recessionary shock effect.9 Finally, our 
data set, by allowing us to compare the real and ﬁnancial market performance of ofﬁce Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) with some New York exposure to those without any New York presence, also 
enables us to separate the local effects from the shocks that affected the entire U.S. ofﬁce real estate 
market. 
We are certainly not the ﬁrst to investigate the impact of terrorist acts on real and ﬁnancial 
markets. Unfortunately, as Karolyi (2006, p. 2) observes in his comprehensive survey of the extant 
literature on the topic, ‘‘…terrorism is not a recent phenomenon.’’10 Most of these studies examine the 
possibly ‘‘abnormal’’ impact of terrorist attacks on either economic activity, national stock markets, or 
individual ﬁrms directly or indirectly affected (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Straetmans, 
Verschoor, and Wolff, 2003; Chen and Siems, 2004; Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005; Karolyi and Martell, 
2006).11 For instance, Karolyi and Martell (2006) ﬁnd that, around the day of 75 such events, the average 
abnormal returns of publicly-traded companies in developed and emerging markets are large and 
negative. We contribute to this literature by analyzing both the relation between the ﬁnancial and real 
underlying performance of ofﬁce REITs as well as the behavior of different categories of ﬁnancial market 
participants in the aftermath of September 11.12 In that respect, the main hypothesis we test in this 
study is whether the speed with which those three categories of market participants (insiders, analysts, 
and all other investors) adjusted to the true underlying behavior of the real markets is consistent with 
the notion of semi-strong (rather than strong-form) market efﬁciency (e.g., Fama, 1970), i.e., whether 
their actions and the ensuing market prices rapidly responded to newly available public (rather than 
                                                          
8The New York ofﬁce area is the largest ofﬁce market in the U.S., representing approximately 9% of its total urban 
ofﬁce space. At the time of the September 11 attacks, the ofﬁce vacancy rate in New York was only 3%. 
9We document these conﬂicting stances in Section 4 by examining analysts’ reports in the months following 
September 11. 
10Using information from the U.S. Department of State, Karolyi and Martell (2006) list 881 acts of terrorism world-
wide between 1995 and 2002. 
11Similarly, many studies examine the reaction of security prices to natural disasters. A (by no means 
comprehensive) list of recent examples includes Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1990), Angboza and Narayanan 
(1996), and Lamb (1998). One exception is Poteshman (2006), who ﬁnds an unusually high level of put option 
buying for airline stocks a few days before 9/11. 
12Relatedly, Glaser and Weber (2005) show that a randomly selected group of 86 individual investors with accounts 
at a German online broker interpreted the large drop in share prices in the German stock market in the ﬁrst ten 
days after September 11 as temporary. 
private) information. Each of these groups had a different information set and, presumably, based on 
the events on and following September 11, adjusted their beliefs about returns in different ways. 
Speciﬁcally, did insiders react faster than analysts, who in turn acted more quickly than all other 
investors? Our measurement of this speed of revision is necessarily indirect. We evaluate insiders’ 
beliefs by their relative levels of selling and buying of ofﬁce REITs. We evaluate analysts’ beliefs by their 
recommendations on ofﬁce REITs. Lastly, we evaluate all other investors’ beliefs by measuring those 
REITs’ stock price performance relative to a broad REIT index benchmark. 
To this purpose, we analyze all public REITs that specialize in ofﬁce properties, with the sole 
exception of the two ofﬁce REITs that owned properties directly hit by the terrorist attack to downtown 
Manhattan.13 This allows us to assess the performance of the underlying ofﬁce properties (i.e., the 
physical rather than the securitized assets) by the end of the last quarter of 2001. This horizon strikes a 
balance between being long enough for us to assess the economic impact of the event on the real 
markets, and being short enough so that unrelated factors do not contaminate our performance 
measurements.14 The resulting sample of 27 ofﬁce REITs allows us to study market participants’ 
expectations about the impact of September 11 on the remaining supply of New York ofﬁce space, both 
in an absolute sense and in relation to other U.S. ofﬁce properties. REITs provide an ideal structure for 
our empirical tests for a number of reasons: (i) because of the availability of data on REIT holdings, we 
can accurately estimate each REIT’s exposure to the New York ofﬁce market; (ii) detailed data on the 
performance of the underlying real asset markets are available; (iii) the performance of the ofﬁce REITs 
with New York exposure can be benchmarked against ofﬁce REITs without New York exposure to control 
for macro real estate market effects. 
To survey our results brieﬂy, we ﬁnd evidence that the U.S. (ofﬁce REIT) stock market behaved 
in a manner consistent with semi-strong market efﬁciency. This ﬁnding is remarkable in light of our prior 
observation that the event we examine was not only unprecedented in scale and scope but also likely 
unanticipated. Nevertheless, the activity of corporate insiders and analysts in the event’s aftermath is 
inconsistent with strong-form market efﬁciency. Speciﬁcally, we show that the equity market initially 
anticipated that REITs with an exposure to the New York market would achieve signiﬁcant gains relative 
to their benchmark, consistent with the supply reduction effect. REITs with exposure to the New York 
                                                          
13These REITs are Brookﬁeld Properties and TriZecHahn Corporation. 
14Indeed, the impact on properties in the damaged areas involved highly complex insurance claims that were far 
from being resolved in the ﬁrst three months after 9/11. The impact of September 11 on insurers is analyzed in 
depth by Doherty, Lamm-Tennant, and Starks (2003), who test the validity of several theoretical insurance models 
of external shocks. 
market experienced an average excess return of 4:1% from the close on September 10 to the close on 
September 17 relative to a broad REIT index. In contrast, the subsequent performance in the real asset 
market for ofﬁce properties appeared to have reﬂected the recessionary shock hypothesis. According to 
several measures of real asset performance, New York properties experienced either a signiﬁcantly 
negative or no abnormal performance with respect to similar ofﬁce properties in the U.S. over the three- 
month horizon following the terrorist attack. Yet, we also ﬁnd that the divergence between the equity 
market’s assessment of the impact of the events of 9/11 on New York REITs and the corresponding 
resolution in the real markets quickly disappeared: The cumulative abnormal returns on New York REITs 
drifted to zero by early November. 
New York REIT insiders were the ﬁrst to accurately identify these developments. For the ﬁrst 
eight months of 2001, insider trading patterns were almost identical for REITs with and without New 
York exposure. However, in the trimester after September 11, insider sales signiﬁcantly exceeded insider 
purchases for REITs with New York exposure— and both the number of New York REIT insiders 
executing sales (purchases) and the number of shares they sold (bought) as a fraction of their prior 
share holdings increased (declined)—while the reverse was often true for non-New York REITs. For 
instance, in the month following the re-opening of U.S. ﬁnancial markets, insider trading in REITs with 
New York exposure was 26 times insider trading in REITs of comparable total market capitalizations but 
without New York exposure; in addition, sales represented 99:9% of the total volume of insider trades in 
New York REITs, but just 68% of the total volume of insider trades in REITs with no New York properties. 
This divergence suggests that insiders of New York REITs used their information to increase the 
frequency of their selling activity, in anticipation of the subsequent negative performance of the real 
market. Analysts followed this trend, albeit with a delay and with historically highly heterogeneous 
earnings forecasts. For example, all the ﬁnancial reports that we found issued in the ten days following 
9/11 indicated that REIT analysts initially expected New York REITs to beneﬁt from the reduction in 
supply. However, just one quarter later, the same analysts began to emphasize the fact that the 
anticipated increased Manhattan demand was being efﬁciently absorbed and lowered their price 
forecasts for New York REITs. This evidence on both the timing and intensity of the trading activity in 
ofﬁce REITs and the dynamics of those REITs’ stock prices in the aftermath of September 11 is consistent 
with theoretical studies arguing that the correlation among insiders and analysts’ information 
endowments is an important determinant of trading and pricing patterns in semi-strong efﬁcient market 
settings (e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; Wang, 1998; Back, Cao, 
and Willard, 2000; Pasquariello and Vega, 2007). 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant REIT data set. 
Section 3 presents and analyzes our empirical results. Section 4 investigates the signiﬁcance of several 
alternative explanations for the ofﬁce REITs’ reaction to the events of September 11. Section 5 
concludes. 
Data Description 
We construct our ofﬁce REIT sample from the SNL Financial’s REIT database.15 We use SNL’s 
classiﬁcation to obtain all REITs having an ofﬁce property orientation (29 REITs), but exclude those with 
any exposure to downtown Manhattan (Brookﬁeld Properties and TriZecHahn Corporation). This leaves 
a sample of 27 REITs, which we use in the analysis that follows. Since SNL reports the location and 
square feet of each property in a REIT’s portfolio, we segment our sample of ofﬁce REITs into those 
having a New York metropolitan area exposure and those without. We deﬁne the New York 
metropolitan area as New York City, the outer boroughs (Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, The Bronx), 
Long Island (including Nassau and Suffolk), Westchester (including Rockland County), Southern 
Connecticut (including Fairﬁeld, Hartford, and New Haven counties), and Northern New Jersey (including 
Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, Sussex, Union, and Warren counties). For each ofﬁce REIT in our 
sample, we calculated the total square footage for its ofﬁce properties in the New York metropolitan 
area. We scaled these ﬁgures by dividing each by the total square feet of ofﬁce space in the entire REIT 
portfolio. This yields the percentage of an ofﬁce REIT’s square footage that is in the New York 
metropolitan Area (PctNYMetro). 
We obtain close-to-close daily REIT returns and trading volumes from CRSP, the three- month 
Treasury Bill rate from the Federal Reserve,16 and the daily return on the Morgan Stanley REIT Index 
(MSREIT), a popular capitalization-weighted benchmark index of the most actively traded REITs, over the 
interval 01/02/1998–09/17/2001, from Bloomberg. Opening and closing daily prices for REITs as well as 
the Standard & Poor’s S&P500 Index from the close on Monday, September 10, 2001 to the open and 
close of Monday, September 17, 2001 are from the website http://ﬁnance.yahoo.com. Daily returns on 
other value-weighted equity indexes are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
To assess the performance of the real markets we use the two most important valuation 
parameters in the real estate literature, the cap rate (i.e., the reciprocal of the EBITDA, Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization, a common measure of proﬁtability) and the Net Asset 
                                                          
15SNL Financial is the premier ﬁnancial information provider for in-depth coverage of the real estate sectors. 
16 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/#daily 
Value (NAV). Liu and Mei (1992) show that the real market, as proxied by the cap rate, can predict 
equity REIT returns. Mei and Lee (1994) further ﬁnd that the real estate premium found in Liu and Mei 
(1992) captures the systematic risk in the real estate market rather than real estate market 
imperfections. Damodaran and Liu (1993) ﬁnd that NAVs contain information, by showing that insiders 
buy (sell) after they receive favorable (unfavorable) NAV news, especially for negative appraisals. Finally, 
Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2004) reveal that investors can proﬁt from the deviations of REIT stock prices 
from their NAVs; using REIT data since 1990, they ﬁnd large positive excess returns result from buying 
stocks trading at a discount to NAV, and shorting stocks trading at a premium to NAV. The authors also 
ﬁnd that the average price-to-NAV ratio is mean reverting toward one, implying that the aggregate price 
to NAV ratio can be used to predict aggregate REIT returns. NAVs and cap rates are also important tools 
for Wall Street REIT analysts. For example, according to A. G. Edwards (2000), ‘‘….a NAV analysis 
provides practical observations about the real estate value of a REIT relative to its public market 
valuation. A NAV analysis is also helpful on a relative basis in making decisions regarding the allocation 
of capital between direct real estate and real estate in the REIT format.’’ 
In this study, we take quarterly cap rates on real estate for New York and the nation, starting 
from the second quarter of 1994, from three sources: 
1. The American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) publication Investment Bulletin: Mortgage 
Commitments on Multifamily and Nonresidential Properties reported by 20 life 
insurance companies; 
2. The National Real Estate Index (NREI) Market Monitor; 
3. Korpacz Real Estate Investor Survey published by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC).17 
We use quarterly cap rates in conjunction with EBITDA for each REIT taken from the SNL REIT 
database to calculate the NAV per share for each REIT.18 Each REIT’s NAV is computed as the ratio 
between its trailing twelve-month EBITDA and its blended cap rate. Individual blend cap rates are 
weighted averages of either actual (from NREI and ACLI) or expectational (from PWC) cap rates for both 
                                                          
17The three sources of data differ. The Korpacz Real Estate Investor Survey is a quarterly survey of expectations of 
returns on investment in institutional-grade, real property from major institutional equity real estate market 
participants. NREI reports actual transactions of large income-producing properties, including those of REITs and 
real estate operating companies. The resulting index attempts to keep quality constant by tracking only 
commercial real estate transactions that meet pre-speciﬁed property characteristics. The ACLI also reports actual 
transactions of institutional grade real properties made by 20 life insurance companies; however, it does not 
adjust for those properties’ differing quality. 
18When these data were missing from the SNL REIT database, we obtained them from the REITs’ 10Q forms. NAVs 
per share are computed to control for share repurchases and secondary stock offerings. 
New York and the U.S., with weights given by the REIT’s exposure to the New York metropolitan area. In 
the next section, we compute the time series of internal rates of returns (IRRs) for each of the REITs in 
our sample as the percentage quarterly change in these NAVs to measure the actual performance of 
their underlying real assets following September 11. 
Empirical Results 
Results from the Financial Markets 
Table 1 presents the basic characteristics of the 27 REITs in our sample as of September 1, 2001. 
Each REIT was mainly involved in ofﬁce properties, although three REITs with substantial holdings in the 
New York metropolitan area (Forest City Enterprises, Lexington, and Voronado) were more diversiﬁed. 
Our analysis focuses on the group of 12 that had signiﬁcant exposure to New York ofﬁce properties 
(except downtown Manhattan, by construction); we dub this group New York REITs.19 Of our New York 
REIT sample, three had over half of their total holdings in the New York area: SL Green (100%), Reckson 
Associates (93%) and Mack-Cali Realty (62%). The remaining 15 had no investment in the New York area. 
They represent a control sample in order to capture the more general effects of the event on the overall 
real estate market; we call this subset the national group. 
Table 2 documents the stock market behavior of these REITs over the period from the close of 
the market on Monday September 10 to the open (column 2) and close (column 3) on Monday 
September 17, the ﬁrst trading day after September 11. It is important to test the price behavior both at 
the opening, which incorporates the information over the period of the market closure, and, as a 
robustness check, at the close of the ﬁrst trading day as well. The latter in fact captures the impact of 
any new information on the stock market’s reaction to the crisis and is unaffected by distortions that 
can occur in opening prices. Panel A gives the unadjusted percentage change. The New York group 
gained an average of 1.998% at the open, but gave almost all of it back over the course of the trading 
day to close at a small average gain of 0.390%. Conversely, the national group opened 2.075% lower and 
then lost a further 1.291% to close at a loss of 3.366%. In both of these cases the New York average is 
signiﬁcantly greater than the national average at the 5% level. This indicates that the market believed 
that the entire real estate sector would suffer because of the event, but that (presumably because of 
the supply reduction effect) New York ofﬁce REITs would appreciate in value. Similarly, the dispersion of 
                                                          
19 In our subsequent analysis, we adjust for the relative proportions of properties within and outside the New York 
area in each of these REITs. 
returns was signiﬁcantly higher (at least at the 10% level) for the New York group. The standard 
deviations at the open and close are in fact 5.683% and 3.493% for the New York group versus 1.676% 
and 2.344% for the national group. Panel B performs the same calculations with New York REIT returns 
relative to the S&P500 Index, which opened 4.624% lower than on September 10 and lost another 
1.610% during the day. The New York group now shows a relative gain of 6.622% at the open and 
6.624% at the close. Analogous inference is drawn from comparing New York REIT returns on September 
17, 2001 to the performance on that day of either a narrower index, the Dow Jones 30 Index, or broader 
ones, such as the CRSP value-weighted equity portfolio and each of its cap-based deciles.20 
 
                                                          
20By the end of September 17, 2001, the CRSP value-weighted equity index declined by 5:071%—while its large, 
mid, small, and micro caps portfolios were down by 3:314%, 3:345%, 5:183%, and 5:273%, respectively—with 
respect to the close on September 10, 2001. Similarly, the Dow Jones 30 Index lost 6:798% at the open on 
September 17, 2001 and an additional 1:320% throughout that day. 
Table 3 presents the cross-sectional correlations of the REIT groups. It shows that the 
correlation between the price change (close-to-open) on September 17, 2001 and both the amount of 
square footage and percentage of property held in the New York area are high (0.827 and 0.781, 
respectively) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Figs. 1a and b plot those percentage price 
changes versus the corresponding REIT’s amount of square footage in the New York metropolitan area 
and percentage exposure to that market, respectively. In both cases, the (unreported) slope is positive 
(and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level) and there is clustering of negative returns for REITs with zero 
New York exposure. This evidence provides further support to the notion that the shock to supply was 
an important factor in driving upward New York REITs’ market prices on September 17, 2001. 
 
In Table 4 we estimate the excess REIT market reaction to the events of September 11. There is 
an extensive real estate asset pricing literature assessing the relevance of several economic and ﬁnancial 
factors for the stock market performance of publicly traded real estate companies (e.g., Chan, 
Hendershott, and Sanders, 1990; Ling and Naranjo, 1996, 2002, 2003; Karolyi and Sanders, 1999; Ling, 
Naranjo, and Ryngaert, 2000). In that respect, Kallberg, Liu, and Trzcinka (2000) show that a one-factor 
return generating process with a broad REIT index as the factor performs as well as more complex multi- 
factor models (e.g., including returns on government bond portfolios and/or on size-based, growth-
based, and value-based stock portfolios). We therefore use the following return generating process to 
compute ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘abnormal’’ returns: 
𝒓𝒊𝒕
𝑪𝑪 − 𝒓𝑭𝒕 =∝𝒊+ 𝜷𝒊(𝒓𝑴𝒕 − 𝒓𝑭𝒕) + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
where 𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐂𝐂 is the return on REIT i from the close on day t - 1 to the close on day t, 𝐫𝐅𝐭 is the yield on the 
90-day Treasury bill on day t, and 𝐫𝐌𝐭 is the return on day t on the Morgan Stanley REIT index. Eq. (1) is 
estimated over the interval January 2, 1998–September 10, 2001 for each of the REITs in the sample. We 
then use those coefﬁcients to compute normal (i.e., benchmark) close-to-close REIT returns 𝒓�𝒊𝒕
𝑪𝑪 on day 
T*=September 17, 2001, i.e., from the close on September 10 to the close on September 17. The 
resulting R2s are quite high for daily data, averaging about 21%. The average estimates of ∝𝐢 and 𝛃𝐢 in 
Eq.(1) are -0.0002 and 0.925, respectively, indicating satisfactory performance of the benchmark. The 
national group showed no abnormal returns as well: each of the estimated ∝𝐢 s is in fact statistically 
insigniﬁcant. 
According to Table 4, the 12 REITs with exposure to the New York metropolitan area CC out-
performed the overall U.S. real estate market by 4:1% on average: 𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐂𝐂 −  𝒓�𝒊𝒕𝑪𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟒𝟏 in row NY of 
Table 4. This ﬁgure is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level using either sample standard errors or 
bootstrapped standard errors computed over the widest available sample period outside the event 
window (from September 18, 2001 to December 31, 2002) for 100 sets of 12 randomly selected REITs 
among the universe of ofﬁce REITs in our sample (listed in Table 1) as of September 1, 2001 (column 
pboot in Table 4). The superior performance of the New York REIT group was even more pronounced at 
the opening of trading. Normal close-to-close New York REIT returns 𝒓�𝒊𝒕
𝑪𝑪 from Eq. (1) are estimated to 
be about 5.7% lower than the corresponding return from the close on September 10 to the open on 
September 17, 𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐂𝐎. Furthermore, estimated abnormal returns are the greatest for REITs for which 
close-to-open returns 𝐫𝐢𝐓∗𝐂𝐎 are positive on September 17; 88% of those REITs had ofﬁce properties in 
New York. 
 
 
Results from the Real Markets 
The above evidence suggests that the REIT equity markets anticipated that the supply reduction 
effect would dominate the recessionary shock effect and thus moved the prices of REITs with New York 
exposure signiﬁcantly higher than REITs without New York exposure. We now turn our attention to the 
actual performance of the underlying real assets over the three months that followed the event. This 
interval was chosen in order to have enough time for the key uncertainty surrounding the crisis to be 
resolved, but short enough so that other exogenous factors do not begin to play an important role in 
real asset returns. 
Based on the observations in Section 2, we use a variety of measures of real market 
performance based on expectational and realized data in order to present a robust analysis. In 
particular, we focus on different measures of quarterly internal rates of return (IRRs) for each of the 
REITs in the sample. We deﬁne REIT i’s IRR in quarter t𝜏, irrit, as the percentage change in its NAV over 
that period. Then, we compare those IRRs to benchmark IRRs given by weighted averages of New York 
and national real rates of return. Speciﬁcally, we compute excess IRRs in three steps. First, we compute 
‘‘normal’’ quarterly real rates of return for NY ofﬁce REITs estimating the following regression over the 
time period 1994.Q2 to 2001.Q2 (29 observations): 
𝐢𝐫𝐫𝛕
𝐍𝐘 − 𝐫𝐅𝛕 = 𝛂 + 𝛃(𝐫𝐔𝐒𝛕 − 𝐫𝐅𝐭) + 𝛈𝛕 
which mimics Eq. (1) using rates of return from real rather than ﬁnancial markets.21 Here irrτNY and rUSτ 
are the estimated New York and nation-wide real estate IRR in quarter τ, respectively, from the Korpacz 
Data Index, which is constructed with a variety of measures of real market performance (see Section 2), 
while rFt is the yield on the 90-day Treasury bill over quarter t. Second, the resulting estimated 
coefﬁcients ∝�= 0.003 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂? = 0.831, are used to compute ‘‘normal’’ NY REIT returns, 𝚤𝑟𝑟�𝜏∗𝑁𝑌 =
𝑖𝑟𝑟𝜏∗
𝑁𝑌 − 𝜂𝜏∗�  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 ∗= 2001. Q4, to control for the impact of the idiosyncratic events of September 11 
on the NY ofﬁce business. The R2 of 83% indicates that Eq. (2) does an excellent job of describing NY 
REITs’ real returns. Finally, excess IRR for each REIT in quarter τ*=2001. Q4 is computed as the 
difference between its quarterly IRR, irriτ*, and the corresponding benchmark 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐵𝑖𝜏 = 𝜔𝑖𝚤𝑟𝑟�𝜏∗𝑁𝑌 + (1 −
𝜔1)𝑟𝑈𝑆𝜏∗, where 𝜔𝑖 is the percentage of the REIT i’s ofﬁce space in the NY metro area reported in Table 
1. 
                                                          
21Since REIT IRRs can be computed only at the quarterly frequency, we estimate Eq. (2) over the longest interval for 
which those quarterly data are available to us. Nonetheless, the results that follow are virtually identical when 
estimating Eq. (2) over a shorter interval equivalent to that used for the estimation of Eq. (1), i.e., 1998.Q1 to 
2001.Q2 (just 14 observations). 
Table 5a reports estimated excess IRRs measured using the percentage quarterly change in Net 
Asset Value (NAV) for each REIT in the sample computed using three different blend (i.e., weighted) cap 
rates: The NREI data in columns 3 and 4, the ACLI data in columns 5 and 6, and the expectational data 
from PWC in columns 7 and 8 (see Section 2). The most striking result is the difference between the 
ensuing average abnormal real returns and the estimated excess REIT returns in Table 4. According to 
Table 5a, average excess real market performance for the REITs in our sample over the last quarter of 
2001 was either statistically signiﬁcantly negative or zero in each of their subsets sorted on the basis of 
the performance of their stock on September 17, 2001. According to Table 4, those REITs’ stock 
performance was instead much more heterogeneous on that day. In particular, Table 5a shows that the 
real abnormal returns to the New York REITs over the quarter immediately following 9/11 were always 
negative, in contrast to their positive relative performance in the ﬁnancial markets over the period of 
market closure (4:1% in Table 4). However, these returns are only statistically signiﬁcant when using 
bootstrapped standard errors computed over the widest available sample period outside the event 
window (the ﬁrst half of 2002, column pboot in Table 5a): sample average abnormal real returns for NY 
REITs, 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝜏∗
𝐵, based on each of the three measures above, were -5 6%, -2:1%, and -6:0% (with 
sample t-statistics of -1:59, -0:56, and -1:61), respectively. In addition, although the real market 
performance of the national group was somewhat higher according to each of our three metrics, the 
differences between the two groups are never statistically signiﬁcant. Still, this comparison is somewhat 
inappropriate because of the different benchmarks used to compute abnormal performance in the two 
groups. Similarly, REITs that had positive returns at the open on September 17, 2001 (𝑟𝑖𝑇∗𝐶𝑜 ≥ 0) under-
performed those REITs with negative returns at the open (𝑟𝑖𝑇∗𝐶𝑜 < 0) by 3:3%, 2:8%, and 6:7%, 
respectively, while REITs that increased in price from close-to-close out-performed those that lost in two 
of the three cases (using NREI and ACLI measures). Nonetheless, none of these differences is statistically 
signiﬁcant. 
 
 
  
Table 5b reports the same analysis when NAVs are calculated with only U.S. cap rates, to ensure 
that our results are not driven by the procedure used to compute blend cap rates. The results parallel 
those obtained in Table 5a. The under-performance of the New York group is now more pronounced, 
and signiﬁcantly negative, for each of the three measures. When comparing those negative excess real 
returns across subsets of our sample, we again ﬁnd that the New York group under-performed the 
national group, although now the differences are much larger: about 4:3% using either NREI, ACLI, or 
PWC data. However, REITs that gained or lost during the ﬁrst trading day had virtually identical 
performance. Moreover, none of these differences is statistically signiﬁcant, as in Table 5a. We obtained 
similar results (not reported here) by computing REIT IRRs from changes in their Net Equity Values 
(NEV), equal to their NAVs minus Debt. 
Finally, we further investigate the real performance of the New York ofﬁce market by computing 
four additional measures of real estate market dynamics commonly used by practitioners: the nominal 
rent index, the going-in cap rates, the expectational IRR, and the NEVs deﬁned above. We ﬁnd that (i) 
the nominal rent index for New York declined by 4:6% (versus an average of 2:6% for the rest of the 
U.S.)22; (ii) the in-going cap rates for New York actually increased by 10:1%, yet less so than the average 
of 10:6% for markets outside New York23; (iii) expectational IRRs for New York increased by 33 basis 
points versus an average decrease of 18 basis points for the rest of the U.S.24; (iv) NEVs for the ﬁrst three 
months following 9/11 were not signiﬁcantly different across the REITs with or without New York 
exposure in our sample. Overall, this evidence, although somewhat mixed, corroborates our earlier 
analysis of excess IRRs: the real performance of New York REITs was either weaker than or not 
statistically different from that of REITs with no such exposure. 
Analyzing the Adjustments to Real Market Conditions 
Our analysis suggests that, while New York ofﬁce REITs experienced signiﬁcantly positive 
abnormal stock market returns from the close on September 10 to the close on September 17, 2001, 
this superior performance did not materialize in the real asset markets. Speciﬁcally, in the quarter 
following September 11, the real asset markets in New York signiﬁcantly under-performed relative to 
both their benchmarks and REITs without New York exposure, regardless of the measure of real asset 
performance employed. Armed with these results, we now turn to the major issue raised in this study: 
How quickly did each of the three groups of market participants we consider, insiders, analysts, and all 
other REIT equity investors, adjust to the real market conditions? To address this issue, we ﬁrst examine 
the trading behavior of insiders in the months before and after 9/11. Secondly, we investigate the 
recommendations of REIT analysts around the event. Finally, we examine the abnormal returns on New 
York REITs in the months subsequent to the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks. As noted earlier, semi-
strong (but not strong-form) market efﬁciency would imply that insiders (because of their superior 
information set) should react ﬁrst, followed by analysts (because of their superior access to insiders’ 
                                                          
22Source: Torto-Wheaton. 
23Source: American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI). 
24Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (Korpacz). 
information) and, lastly, the revised expectations of all other investors should reduce REIT abnormal 
returns. 
REIT Insiders 
Fig. 2a and Table 6 perform the ﬁrst of these tests. Fig. 2a plots the cumulative sums of scaled 
differences between total insider purchases (BUYt) and sales (SELLt) in ofﬁce REITs with (solid line) or 
without (dashed line) exposure to the New York metropolitan area in each month of 2001, (BUYt-
SELLt)/(BUYt+SELLt), as in Rozeff and Zaman (1988). Table 6 reports additional summary statistics on REIT 
insiders’ trading activity over the same period. The data are from WRDS (Wharton Research Data 
Services) TFN Insider Filing Data Files.25 There is a large body of empirical evidence indicating that the 
trading activity of insiders may be motivated mainly by their information advantage with respect to all 
other market participants (e.g., Seyhun, 1986, 1988; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Damodaran and Liu, 
1995). In addition, Seyhun (1990) ﬁnds that in the immediate aftermath of the October 1987 Crash, 
corporate insiders successfully exploited stock market overreaction by purchasing their companies’ 
shares in record numbers. Accordingly, we conjecture that if insiders correctly believed that the prices of 
REITs with New York exposure would ultimately decline relative to their peers after 9/11, then we 
should see a relatively higher amount of selling by the insiders of New York REITs in the ﬁrst few months 
following the attack. 
Fig. 2a suggests that the cumulative ratios for REITs with and without New York exposure were 
similar prior to September 11. During that interval, sales were approximately 46% of all insider trades—
and average monthly ratios (BUYt-SELLt)/(BUYt+SELLt), in Panel A of Table 6, were positive—for both 
groups, indicating a common preponderance of insiders’ purchases. However, in the ﬁrst three months 
after September 11, insider sales exceeded insider purchases for NY REITs and the corresponding 
average monthly ratios (BUYt-SELLt)/(BUYt+SELLt) turned negative, while insider purchases continued to 
be prevalent for REITs without New York exposure. These cross-sectional and time-series differences, 
reported in panel A of Table 6, are both economically meaningful and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% 
level). Hence, the resulting cumulative insider trading ratio in Fig. 2a trended downward and eventually 
turned negative by December 2001, while the cumulative ratio for the national group continued to trend 
                                                          
25This database, available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu, contains all insider activity as reported on SEC forms 
3, 4, 5, and 144. According to the WRDS documentation, ‘‘Corporate insiders are deﬁned broadly to include those 
that have ‘access to non-public, material, insider information’ and these insiders are required to ﬁle SEC form 3, 4, 
and 5 when they trade in their company’s stock.’’ We were unable to compute dollar amounts for these trades 
because, in many cases, the actual transaction prices were not reported. 
upward. Consistently, both the number of New York REIT insiders executing purchases (Panel E of Table 
6) and the number of shares they purchased as a fraction of their prior share holdings (Panel B of Table 
6) declined. The opposite is true for their selling activity (in Panels F and C of Table 6, respectively). Yet, 
in both cases the estimated differences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, the divergence in selling 
and buying patterns emerging from Fig. 2a and Tables 6 indicates that insiders of the New York group 
used their information advantage to increase the frequency and intensity of their selling activity. 
 
The analysis of each of the trades reported by REIT insiders offers further evidence on the 
nature of their trading activity after September 11. In particular, we focus on the ﬁrst month following 
the terrorist attack. Over this sample period, the total amount of trading by insiders of REITs not 
exposed to the New York area was relatively small, totaling only $0:9 million. Of these trades, 68% were 
sales; yet a single one, executed on September 17, 2001, dominated that balance, amounting to $0:57 
million. In contrast, trades by insiders of the New York group totaled $23:4 million. Of this total, about 
99:9% were sales. These observations conﬁrm our earlier ﬁnding of signiﬁcantly higher selling by New 
York REIT insiders immediately after 9/11, and are consistent with the notion that insiders believed the 
U.S. stock market had temporarily overvalued those securities relative to other ofﬁce REITs. 
REIT Analysts 
The second part of our analysis focuses on the behavior of REIT analysts following September 
11. We searched Investext for analyst reports regarding the impact of the WTC attacks on REITs issued 
around the time of the attack.26 As a speciﬁc illustration, we focus on analysts’ reports for Mack-Cali 
(CLI), the NY REIT followed by the largest number of analysts in our sample.27 On August 16th, 2001 
Morgan Stanley issued a note maintaining its position that Mack Cali was expected to ‘‘under perform’’ 
(even though they beat analyst estimates) based on erosion in market fundamentals and on the 
expected acceleration of their disposition program, which was expected to dilute earnings.28 This 
negative opinion was partly based on management’s lowering expected 2001 earnings to reﬂect 
potential occupancy erosion in their portfolio, the sustainability of rental rates, and the timing of the 
company’s ongoing capital recycling program. Prior to 9/11, REIT analysts from other investment banks 
held a similar opinion about the New York market and Mack-Cali in particular as Table 7 shows. 
All the reports that we found issued in the 10 days following 9/11 indicated that REIT analysts 
expected New York area REITs to beneﬁt from the anticipated scramble for space in both Midtown and 
in NJ, CT, Long Island, and Westchester based on an expected tightening of ofﬁce market space in the 
short run. For example, from Axelrod (2001), ‘‘y the taking out of 25 million square feet of Manhattan 
ofﬁce space has dramatically tightened the entire NYC metro ofﬁce market which stood at 7:5% vacancy 
(direct and sublease, Manhattan only) at the end of Q201. However, for the rest of the national ofﬁce 
markets, a recession is a decided negative.’’ Given this anticipated reduction in supply, analysts raised 
their target price for REITs having a New York presence. From Raiman, Dembski, Habermann, and 
Schwalbe (2001), ‘‘... in response to shrinkage of ofﬁce supply in Manhattan—and its positive 
                                                          
26Investext is currently the world’s largest online database of company and industry investment research reports. 
These reports are not generally available through public channels. 
27In addition, Mack-Cali had a sizable presence in the New York metropolitan area as of September 1, 2001 (about 
62% of its ofﬁce properties, based on square footage, according to Table 1). 
28This report, Whyte (2001), was the last analyst report issued on Mack-Cali prior to the attack on the World Trade 
Center. 
implication on the tri-state market, we are raising our target price to $34-$35 on Mack-Cali Realty given 
its ofﬁce concentration in the Tri-State area.’’ 
 
However, analysts just one quarter later emphasized the fact that the anticipated occupancy 
pressure was not offset with increased Manhattan demand. As noted in Litt (2001), ‘‘y the vast amount 
of ‘phantom vacancy’ that appeared in Manhattan following the attack will likely limit some of the 
upside we expected in Mack-Cali’s 2002 occupancy as many displaced tenants have found space in 
Manhattan.’’ Taylor and Goebel (2001) agreed, stating that ‘‘y the WTC impact was short lived y tenants 
in midtown New York have been rethinking their space needs and giving up space. This has relaxed the 
tightness in the NYC market that had driven demand to Harborside (in Jersey City, NJ). Like most 
investors and analysts, we thought there’d be a beneﬁt from the loss of space in Manhattan. We 
thought it would be short term, but not this short.’’ Finally, Paolone (2001) noted in a report made 
available on November 7, 2001 that ‘‘y at this point, much of the scramble for space is over as a result of 
September 11th and the bigger impact is on the negative side as demand wanes.’’ As shown in Table 7, 
Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Bank of America, and Salomon Smith Barney all initially raised their 
earnings estimates immediately following 9/11, but then all lowered those estimates between 
November 8 and 12, 2001. Deutsche Bank issued no updates to its August 10 earnings forecasts in 
response to the terrorist attack until it conﬁrmed them on November 8, only to reduce its 2002 earnings 
estimates the following day. CS First Boston issued a strong buy on September 18, 2001 but released no 
further report until May of 2002. The timing and content of analysts’ recommendations on the other NY 
REITs in our sample over that period provide a strikingly similar picture. For instance, of the analysts that 
published earnings estimates for REITs with NY exposure both in the two weeks following 9/11 and in 
either October or the ﬁrst two weeks of November, downgrades out-numbered upgrades by more than 
three to one. 
Further evidence on ofﬁce REIT analysts’ recommendations prior to and following September 11 
comes from the analysis of Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) data. Speciﬁcally, we collect 
those analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) one-year ahead forecasts for each of the 27 ofﬁce REITs in our 
sample (in Table 1) for which such data are available (21 REITs in total, 10 with New York exposure). We 
then plot (in Fig. 2b) the mean EPS forecasts for ofﬁce REITs with (solid line) or without (dashed line) 
exposure to the New York metropolitan area in each month of 2001. Fig. 2b suggests that in the months 
preceding the WTC attack, Wall Street analysts were becoming increasingly pessimistic exclusively about 
the performance of New York ofﬁce REITs. Indeed, average EPS forecasts between January and 
September 2001 (excluding post-9/11 data) are $8:11 for the latter and only $0:84 for the former. In the 
immediate aftermath of September 11, ofﬁce REIT analysts more than halved their EPS forecasts for 
REITs with no New York exposure, presumably because of the expected recessionary shock effect of the 
terrorist attack on the U.S. economy. Despite this, and consistent with the discussion above, NY REIT 
analysts ﬁrst increased their EPS forecasts, presumably conjecturing that the supply reduction effect 
would dominate any recessionary shock effect on the market for ofﬁce space in the New York 
metropolitan area. It is only by the end of 2001 that EPS forecasts for both groups of REITs appear to 
converge. 
In conjunction with the apparent reversals in NY REITs’ mean EPS forecasts in 2001, their 
analysts’ opinions were also generally heterogeneous. Panel D of Table 6 reports averages of those 
analysts’ monthly dispersion of earnings forecasts, computed as their monthly standard deviation (when 
available for two or more analysts) divided by the absolute value of their mean, as in Diether, Malloy, 
and Scherbina (2002).29 Dispersion in analysts’ EPS forecasts was statistically unchanged in both REIT 
                                                          
29In our sample, dispersion of earnings forecasts can be computed for 6 New York REITs and 9 REITs without New 
York exposure. 
groups in the last quarter of 2001. Differences of opinion among New York REIT analysts were the 
lowest throughout the sample period. Yet, those differences—even in the ﬁrst few months after 
September 11 (about 35% of the absolute mean forecasts)—are greater than all but the highest 
dispersion quintile estimated by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002, Table 2) for the universe of U.S. 
stocks between 1983 and 2000.30 Overall, the above evidence indicates that New York REIT analysts 
(weakly more homogeneously than their national colleagues, but signiﬁcantly less so than historical pre-
9/11 averages) reversed their initial positive outlook—which conﬂicted with a negative outlook for the 
U.S. ofﬁce REIT market—approximately two months after 9/11. 
All Other Investors 
Lastly, we examine the abnormal returns on New York REITs following 9/11. Indeed, if the 
relative values of New York REITs were actually declining, we would expect to see all market participants 
eventually revise their initial expectations rationally, and then the positive abnormal returns registered 
on September 17, 2001 (reported in Table 4) eventually decline (towards zero) as well. This third test is 
performed in Fig. 3, which plots cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, solid line) and their corresponding 
95% conﬁdence intervals (dashed lines) for the 12 NY REITs from September 17, 2001 to December 31, 
2001 (consistent with Table 5), as well as these REITs’ aggregate trading volume (in millions of U.S. 
dollars). We also plot 95% conﬁdence intervals for those CARs based either on bootstrapped standard 
errors (dotted lines, over 100 replications) computed over the widest available sample period outside 
the event window (from January 2, 2002 to December 31, 2002) or on standard errors computed by 
bootstrapping over the same interval for 100 sets of 12 randomly selected REITs among the universe of 
ofﬁce REITs in our sample (Table 1) as of September 1, 2001 (thin solid lines), under the null hypothesis 
of no cumulative excess returns.31 CARs are generated by ﬁrst computing close-to-close abnormal 
returns (ARs) estimated using the market model of Eq. (1) over the interval January 2, 1998–September 
10, 2001 (in Table 4) and then aggregating them over time and across REITs. 
CARs of NY REITs are initially highly positive and signiﬁcant, as a result of the relatively superior 
performance of this group immediately after September 11. However, the solid line drifts quickly 
downward, crossing the upper bound of the OLS conﬁdence interval in early November before reaching 
zero immediately afterwards. In the following weeks, the CARs remain relatively small and often 
                                                          
30For instance, dispersion of analysts’ EPS forecasts averages 10:5% of their absolute mean within the fourth 
dispersion quintile in Table 2 of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). 
31Conﬁdence intervals constructed by repeatedly randomly selecting among the 15 REITs without New York 
exposure lead to the same inference. 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. In comparison, and consistent with Tables 2 and 4, CARs of the 
15 REITs with no NY exposure listed in Table 1 (starred line in Fig. 3) are instead negative, statistically 
signiﬁcant, and steadily declining until early November and virtually unchanged afterwards.32 
Accordingly, aggregate NY REIT trading volume is higher and volatile in the ﬁrst few days after the 
terrorist attacks, but lower and steady afterwards.33 Hence, Fig. 3 shows that although the markets 
initially expected that 9/11 would have a positive impact on New York REITs (and traded on this 
expectation), those REITs’ prices quickly reﬂected the underlying behavior of the real markets (reported 
in Tables 5). In contrast, the stock market performance of REITs without New York exposure mirrored 
their underlying real performance with little delay. Interestingly, the sharp decline in the abnormal 
returns of NY REITs exhibited in Fig. 3 begins on November 7 and lasts until November 19, i.e., around 
the time analysts started revising downward their EPS forecasts for those REITs (e.g., the sequence of 
downgrades for Mack-Cali between November 8 and 12, 2001 in Table 6). This is consistent with the 
notion that ﬁnancial markets eventually reacted to negative analysts’ reports on NY REITs’ future 
earnings. 
                                                          
32Conﬁdence intervals for these CARs nearly overlap with those for the CARs of REITs with NY exposure; thus, they 
are not displayed in Fig. 3. 
33The marked, temporary increase in NY REIT aggregate trading volume in early October 2001 is due to Standard & 
Poors’ decision to include ofﬁce REITs in the S&P500 index after the close of trading on October 9. 
 Real and Financial Market Frictions 
While it is impossible to rigorously evaluate the possible reasons for those estimated differences 
in timing, sign, or magnitude of the reactions of real and ﬁnancial markets, as well as of various groups 
of market participants, to the events of 9/11, two (related) issues are clear. First, analysts and the 
ﬁnancial markets initially anticipated that the supply reduction effect in the New York metro area would 
be sufﬁcient to generate relatively superior returns to NY ofﬁce REITs. However, as we documented 
above, this superior performance did not materialize, at least not in the short run. Second, insiders 
identiﬁed (and exploited) most rapidly this perceived temporary overvaluation of New York ofﬁce REITs 
in the U.S. stock market. 
Real estate practitioners primarily attribute the ﬁrst, real disparity to two sources. In essence, 
these arguments involve the fact that employers laid off workers faster than they could layoff space. 
This factor, coupled with excess space known as ‘‘shadow’’34 space by New York metro area employers, 
resulted in a sufﬁcient supply of space for displaced tenants. According to Grubb and Ellis (2001), by 
December 2001, permanently displaced tenants contracted to take only 48% as much space as they had 
formerly occupied. In addition, since September 11, New York companies that were not directly affected 
re- evaluated their space needs and offered an additional 10:1 million square feet of space available for 
sublet. Much of this additional sublet space came from Wall Street ﬁrms. Consequently, the number of 
displaced tenants that were expected to lease new space somewhere in Manhattan was not as large as 
anticipated. 
In addition to a reduction in the demand for space, corporations also downsized their workforce 
in the post 9/11 period. In New York City, the securities industry alone lost 9; 800 jobs; a total of 31; 100 
private sector jobs were lost in 2002, as the unemployment rate rose to 8:4%. Besides the resulting 
increase in vacancy, the anticipated increase in rents did not materialize in part due to the Real Estate 
Board of New York’s (REBNY) written memo to its members that ‘‘Any member owner, ﬁrm, or broker 
found to be taking advantage of this terrible tragedy will be expelled from the Real Estate Board.’’35 
While some critics might argue that expectations might not have been realized because tenants moved 
out of the New York metro area, Table 8 shows that only a small portion (5.4%) of tenants relocated 
outside of the metro area. The overwhelming majority of displaced tenants (84.9%) chose to remain in 
New York City. 
                                                          
34 The National Association of Realtors (NAR) (2003) deﬁnes shadow space as space that isn’t being occupied by 
the tenant but isn’t being actively marketed either. Shadow space is a difﬁcult number to obtain. In an RCA 
(Realtors Commercial Alliance) Report dated Fall 2003, Torto Wheaton research estimated that nationwide, 
shadow space represents an additional 3% of unoccupied space that is not reﬂected in vacancy numbers. Mitchell 
Stein, CEO of Julien J. Studley Inc., a commercial leasing agent, stated in the same report that shadow space for 
Manhattan accounts for between 2:5% to 3:5% (10 to 14 million square feet) of unoccupied space. Shadow space 
exists not only because ﬁrms can lay off workers faster than they can lay off space but also because companies 
worry they won’t be able to ﬁnd space in the future and thus take more than they presently require. There are 
other reasons that space remains in the shadows. These reasons include the fact that very small amounts of space 
are difﬁcult to lease and that space with only one to two years remaining on a lease is unmarketable except to very 
ﬂexible tenants. Also, the cost to reconﬁgure the space to make it subleasable might not be justiﬁed. 
35According to the information reported on the website http://www.property-mag.com/property/Winter02/ 
coverstory_print.html, REBNY urged its members not to take advantage of displaced tenants when negotiating 
lease rates and suggested using rental rates in place prior to September 11. REBNY also asked brokers to waive 
their usual commissions and fees in assisting displaced tenants who required short-term (less than 12 months) 
leases. 
 
We also consider the possibility that the discrepancy between the relative performance of 
ﬁnancial and real markets for the NY REITs in our sample following September 11 may be due, at least in 
part, to the arrival of idiosyncratic news affecting those REITs between September 10 and September 
17, 2001. We check for this argument by examining all relevant information events taking place for each 
of the 27 REITs in our sample over that interval of time. The ensuing sequence of these events (from 
Lexis-Nexus), reported in Table 9, suggests that none of the REITs under examination experienced 
information shocks signiﬁcant enough to bias our statistical analysis, i.e., to contribute to the abnormal 
returns estimated in Table 4. 
The evidence in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 may shed light on the second, ﬁnancial disparity. Recent 
theoretical studies argue that, in semi-strong efﬁcient market settings a` la Kyle (1985), both the timing 
and intensity of the trading activity of better informed agents are crucially related to whether those 
agents perceive their informational advantage to be homogeneously shared among them (e.g., Holden 
and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; Wang, 1998; Back, Cao, and Willard, 2000; 
Pasquariello and Vega, 2007). In particular, these studies show that homogeneously informed insiders 
are likely to engage in a non-cooperative ‘‘rat race’’—to trade larger amounts sooner—to extract rents 
from their informational advantage before similarly informed competitors do so. In these circumstances, 
market prices rapidly incorporate new information. When more heterogeneously informed, those 
insiders are instead more likely to act as quasi-monopolists, by engaging in a ‘‘waiting game’’—by 
trading smaller amounts later—to extract rents from their informational advantage after differentially 
informed competitors have dissipated theirs. This strategic trading activity ultimately delays the process 
by which new information is incorporated into market prices. Accordingly, our analysis suggests that 
many New York REIT insiders almost uniformly sold large fractions of their share holdings in the 
immediate aftermath of the WTC attack (Fig. 2a and Table 6), and that these trades were proﬁtable (Fig. 
3). In contrast, it took about two months for the plausibly less (and more heterogeneously, Panel D of 
Table 6) informed New York REIT analysts and all other investors to conform their forecasts and prices to 
the negative real performance of the New York ofﬁce market reported in Table 5.36 
                                                          
36Consistently, Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998) provide evidence that analysts’ recommendations for a 
sample of NYSE stocks are generally based on public, rather than private, information. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The ability of ﬁnancial markets to process available information quickly and accurately is the 
cornerstone of modern theories of market efﬁciency. This study examined how three different groups of 
market participants—insiders, analysts, and the general market— revised their beliefs in response to a 
dramatic and unexpected event, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and how their reactions 
compared to the subsequent behavior of the real asset markets. To that end, we analyzed the dynamics 
of returns of REITs exposed to the New York metropolitan area. Two of the unique aspects of this study 
are that (i) the events of September 11 were unprecedented and likely unanticipated, hence could not 
have been built into the market’s prior expectations and prices, and (ii) the potential impact of those 
events on REIT returns was ambiguous, since it was uncertain if the resulting reduced supply of ofﬁce 
space in New York (the supply reduction effect) would dominate the negative repercussions of 9/11 for 
the local and national economy (the recessionary shock effect). A further distinguishing feature of our 
study—as compared to the extant literature on the economic and ﬁnancial consequences of 
unanticipated catastrophic events, either natural or man-made—is that we focus on the speed with 
which these three groups of markets participants were able to incorporate the performance of the 
underlying real asset market in the aftermath of the WTC attack into their expectations for REITs’ 
ﬁnancial performance. 
We ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant evidence of a divergence between ﬁnancial and 
real markets’ assessment of the impact of the events of September 11 on New York REITs’ valuations. 
Indeed, returns on New York ofﬁce REITs from the close on September 10 to the close on September 17 
and returns in the underlying real markets over the following quarter moved in opposite directions. New 
York REITs showed a signiﬁcantly positive abnormal return of 4:1%, while the corresponding real 
markets over the last quarter of 2001 experienced either signiﬁcantly negative or zero abnormal returns 
computed using three popular measures of real performance in the real estate literature. Speciﬁcally, 
our analysis reveals that, in the short run, REITs with signiﬁcant exposure to the New York market 
outperformed REITs without any New York exposure; in contrast, in the underlying real asset markets, 
New York properties experienced either signiﬁcantly negative or no abnormal performance with respect 
to similar ofﬁce properties in the U.S. over the ﬁrst quarter following 9/11. These latter results also 
provide additional evidence on the resiliency of real product markets in response to catastrophic events. 
According to our analysis, the New York real estate market was in fact able to absorb an enormous 
shock without suffering huge price increases or severe shortages. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of 
Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2004) for post World War II Japan and other settings. 
Consistent with notions of semi-strong—but inconsistent with strong-form—market efﬁciency, 
we also ﬁnd that insiders updated their expectations more accurately and faster than analysts, who in 
turn revised their expectations more accurately and faster than all other investors. Speciﬁcally, insiders 
were the ﬁrst to lower their expectations and homogeneously adjust their trading activity consistently 
with the real market. For example, in the month following the re-opening of U.S. ﬁnancial markets, 
insider trading in REITs with New York exposure was 26 times insider trading in REITs of comparable 
total market capitalizations but without New York exposure. Further, sales represented 99:9% of the 
total volume of insider trades in New York REITs, but just 68% of the total volume of insider trades in 
REITs with no New York properties. Analysts were almost as quick to adjust their recommendations, 
albeit more heterogeneously so: after being initially optimistic about the New York ofﬁce market, by 
early November most REIT analysts had lowered their EPS and stock price targets for New York REITs; 
however, the dispersion of their earnings forecasts, already historically high prior to September 11, did 
not signiﬁcantly decline afterwards. Lastly, REIT stock prices adjusted to reﬂect the underlying real 
market behavior; indeed, abnormal REIT returns had disappeared by the end of November 2001. These 
ﬁndings are remarkable since they suggest that both ﬁnancial and real markets responded efﬁciently to 
a massive, unprecedented, and wholly unexpected shock to the economy. 
Finally, we investigate some plausible explanations for the differences in the behavior of real 
and ﬁnancial markets following the events of 9/11. In particular, we explore whether confounding news 
and information heterogeneity could have contributed to both the observed timing and intensity of the 
trading activity in ofﬁce REITs and the initial run-up of their stock prices. We could not identify any 
signiﬁcant idiosyncratic information shock taking place during the ensuing one-week market shut-down 
for any of the REITs in our sample. The weaker-than-expected real performance of NY REITs appears 
instead to be related to the ability of many downtown ﬁrms to reduce space requirements, after the 
forced relocation, and to lower-than-expected actual vacancy rates, as argued by real estate 
practitioners. As interestingly, the trading and pricing dynamics of NY ofﬁce REITs described above are 
compatible with the implications of models of trading that relate price informativeness and volume in 
semi-strong efﬁcient markets to the extent to which insiders and analysts are differentially informed 
(e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; Wang, 1998; Back, Cao, and 
Willard, 2000; Pasquariello and Vega, 2007). 
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